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PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL IN LOUISIANA: AN ANALYSIS
OF ITS CLASSIFICATION, VALUATION, AND PARTITION
Within the last few years, several community property states have
classified professional goodwill as community property while several
noncommunity property states have classified professional goodwill
as an asset of marital property. These classifications recognize the
economic realities involved when a marriage between a professional
spouse and a nonprofessional spouse terminates.' Although each spouse
contributes substantial time and effort to building a secure future,
the nonprofessional spouse often sacrifices his or her career to allow
the other spouse to devote efforts exclusively to a professional prac-
tice. That practice and its assets are the spouses' economic invest-
ment for the future. Yet, when the marriage ends, the professional
spouse retains the practice, including its frequently substantial asset
of professional goodwill. Goodwill, an incorporeal asset, represents the
value of the professional practice beyond the value of the practice's
corporeal and other incorporeal assets.! Goodwill is often the most
valuable asset of professional practices, because most professional prac-
tices offer services and have limited capital investments and relative-
ly few corporeal and other incorporeal assets.3 Classifying professional
Copyright, 1982 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The discussions in this comment are based on the assumption that a profes-
sional person is married to a nonprofessional person. The author realizes that in some
instances both spouses may be professionals; if so, the same principles apply.
2. See Adams, Is Professional Goodwill Divisible Community Property?, 6 COMM.
PROP. J. 61, 63 (1979).
Because of its intangible nature, goodwill is often defined as the difference between
book value and market value. See E. HENDRICKSEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY 345 (8th ed.
1969); W. MEIGS, C. JOHNSON, T. KELLER, & A. MOSICH, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 442
(2d ed. 1968). Accountants view goodwill as "[tihe excess of the amount paid for a
business as a whole over the fair value assigned to its tangible and [other] identifiable
intangible asgets, less the liabilities assumed." G. THOMPSON, R. WHITMAN, E. PHILLIPS,
JR., & W. WARREN, ACCOUNTING AND THE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (4th ed. 1978).
See also T. FIFLIS & H. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS TEACHING MATERIALS
209 (2d ed. 1977).
3. Goodwill has been described as the value of all favorable attributes contributing
to the earning power of a business enterprise. These attributes include customers'
attitudes, efficiency of service, superior products, pleasing surroundings, desirable loca-
tion, skill in utilization of trademarks, brand names, effective advertising, outstanding
credit ratings, satisfactory employee relations, and capable management. See D. HER-
WITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 195-96 (temp. ed. 1978); R. WIXON, W. KELL,
& N. BEDFORD, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK S 19.14 (1970). See also Los Angeles Gas & Elect.
Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 289 U.S. 287, 313 (1933); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.
v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 252 (1917); White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of
Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937); W. PATON & W. PATON, JR., ASSET
ACCOUNTING 488-89 (1952).
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goodwill as community property recognizes the nonprofessional
spouse's share in this major asset.4
Louisiana courts have not yet decided whether professional good-
will is community property. The courts must first recognize that pro-
fessional goodwill is property, for only after they have determined
that professional goodwill is property can they classify it as community
property. Should Louisiana courts find that professional goodwill is
community property, they must adopt methods of valuing it which
afford each spouse the full value of his or her interest in the profes-
sional goodwill at dissolution of the community. Additionally, Loui-
siana courts must partition professional goodwill so as to ensure
realization by the nonprofessional spouse of the present value of his
or her interest in the "community" goodwill.
Professional Goodwill as Property
A crucial determination prior to the classification of professional
goodwill as community property is whether professional goodwill is
"property." Louisiana courts cannot subject an asset to the matrimonial
regimes law and classify it as separate or community property until
that asset has been recognized as property. Furthermore, if profes-
sional goodwill is recognized as property, it will exist as an asset
separate and distinct from the person of the professional and his in-
dividual abilities.5
Traditionally, courts did not consider the goodwill of a professional
practice to be a property right; they considered it to be an inseparable
part of the person of the professional This attitude prevailed because
4. This comment's focus is the community property treatment of professional
goodwill. The approaches of noncommunity property states, although presented, are
not presented in detail because the specifics of their systems are beyond this com-
ment's coverage. For a discussion of the systems in noncommunity property states,
see W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 8,13-24 (1975).
This comment assumes that the professional spouse's practice will continue after
dissolution of marriage. The dissolution of a marriage does not affect the continuation
of a practice nor the continued existence of professional goodwill. Generally, the good-
will of a professional practice will terminate when the practice is dissolved, by either
the death or retirement of the sole practitioner or the.termination of the partnership
or corporation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 686, 689 (1979), citing In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584, 117
Cal. Rptr. 49, 54 (1974).
5. See text at notes 27-31, infra.
6. See, e.g., Virgin v. Slatko, 358 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. App. 1978); Cook v. Lauten,
1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 260-61, 117 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1954); Bailly v. Betti, 241 N.Y. 22, 26-27,
148 N.E. 776, 777 (1925); Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 47-48, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632-33
(1959); Hunt v. Street, 182 Tenn. 167, 174, 184 S.W.2d 553, 555 (1945); Nail v. Nail,
486 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1972). See also Rinke v. Rinke, 330 Mich. 615, 627, 48 N.W.2d
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goodwill was envisioned as dependent solely upon the personal skills
and abilities of the professional person, rather than as a distinct asset
of the practice.' Relatively recent developments in several communi-
ty property states, most notably California and Washington, indicate
that this view is not the modern conception of professional goodwill.8
All but one of the states that have dealt with professional goodwill
in the context of community property law have found it to be
property.9
The concept of "property" in Louisiana is broader than traditional
legal and social notions of what constitutes property." As expressed
201, 207 (1951); Magee v. Pope, 234 Mo. App. 191, 206-07, 112 S.W.2d 891, 899 (1938).
But see, e.g., Maxwell v. Sherman, 172 Ala. 626, 632, 55 So. 520, 522 (1911); In re
Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581-82, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (1974); Mueller
v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250-51, 301 P.2d 90, 94-95 (1956); Durio v. Johnson,
68 N.M. 82, 84-85, 358 P.2d 703, 705 (1961); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d
324, 325-27, 588 P.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1979); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App.
481, 484-486, 558 P.2d 279, 281 (1976).
7. See cases cited in note 6, supra. See, e.g., Trask v. Susskind, 376 F.2d 17, 20
(5th Cir. 1967); Liquidators of Nicholson Pub. Co. v. E.S. Upton Printing Co., 152 La.
270, 278, 93 So. 91, 93 (1922); In re Giants' Estate, 57 Wash. 2d 309, 312, 356 P.2d
707, 709 (1960).
8. See cases cited in notes 33-34, infra. Goodwill is an intangible and often valuable
asset created by the professional's reputation, learning, skill, and experience in his
profession. Goodwill is an asset susceptible of valuation apart from the other assets
of the professional practice. See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250-51, 301
P.2d 90, 94-95 (1956); Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. Ch. 589, 593-95, 135 A.2d 128, 131 (1957);
Durio v. Johnqon, 68 N.M. 82, 84-85, 358 P.2d 703, 705 (1961). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R.
3d 1243, 1244-45 (1977). Furthermore, professional goodwill may be sold and transferred.
Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 763 (1927); Ballero v. Heslin, 128 So. 2d 453, 455 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
"[MIen have been willing to buy and to pay a price for a professional 'practice' with
its goodwill . .. [despite the fact that] . .. Ithe goodwill of a physician, lawyer, or
other professional man is usually pretty strictly personal in character." 6 A. CORBIN,
A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW S 1393, at 83 (1962).
9. See cases cited in notes 33-36, infra.
10. See Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 165 (La. 1977); 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY
1 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 1 (1980). See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 2325, com-
ment (b). Louisiana courts have found that the goodwill of a business is a property
right; however, these courts were dealing with commercial goodwill and not the good-
will of a professional practice. See Succession of Jurisich, 224 La. 325, 330-33, 69 So.
2d 361, 363 (1953); Succession of Conway, 215 La. 819, 828, 41 So. 2d 729, 732 (1949);
Desselle v. Petrossi, 207 So. 2d 190, 193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Ballero v. Heslin,
128 So. 2d 453, 455 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). Traditional narrow notions of property
are reflected in the analysis of professional goodwill in Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761
(Tex. 1972). In Nail, the Texas Supreme Court refused to classify the professional
goodwill of the husband's sole professional practice as property because of traditional
property notions. These concepts are similarly reflected in the Colorado Supreme Court's
determination that a professional degree is not property. See In re Marriage of Graham,
574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978). 1
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by Professor Yiannopoulos, "[a]ll rights that are susceptible of
pecuniary evaluation are property in the sense that they are
guaranteed by the legal order and form part of a person's patrimony.""
Louisiana jurisprudence has specifically adopted this broad concept
of property in Due v. Due."
In Due, the Louisiana Supreme Court classified an attorney's in-
terest in a contingent fee contract as a patrimonial right 3 and as com-
munity property subject to division at dissolution of the marriage. 4
The court, referring to Professor Yiannopoulos, stated that "[p]roper-
ty in its broad sense denotes all patrimonial rights."" It further ex-
plained that "[tihe civil law concept of patrimony includes the total
mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a per-
son for the satisfaction of his economic needs."'"
The civilian theory is that property is a term used to designate
those things, both corporeal and incorporeal, in which people have
rights. The legal system defines the things which may be the ob-
jects of property rights and affords its protection to those things, thus
making them one's property. 8
In theory, the test of whether an asset is a patrimonial asset,
or "property," is its susceptibility to pecuniary evaluation. 9 Additional-
ly, it must be an existing or potential asset or right.M Professional
goodwill is an existing asset which adheres to the practice of the
professional." The fact that professional goodwill is an asset suscepti-
ble of evaluation has been demonstrated by cases in California and
11. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 10, S 1, at 3.
12. 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
13. Id. at 165.
14. Id. at 165-66.
15. Id. at 165, citing A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 10, S 1, at 1. See LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2325, comment (b). "Patrimonial rights are those susceptible of pecuniary evalua-
tion, and which, for this reason, may form a part of a person's patrimony." A. YIAN-
NOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM S 70, at 243 (1971).
16. 342 So. 2d at 165, citing A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 10, S 125, at 319.
17. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 10, S 1, at 2.
18. Id. "Property in the broad sense, means everything that has material or moral
value for human beings, beginning with their own body, reputation, freedom to think
and act." 2 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS S 162 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) in
J. MAYDA, 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 1 (1966).
19. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 39
LA. L. REV. 1106, 1116-17 (1979). See also Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497,
504 (La. 1973).
20. See Comment, supra note 19, at 1116-17.
21. See cases cited in note 7, supra, and text at note 7.
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Washington.22 Furthermore, things similar to professional goodwill
which have presented difficulties in pecuniary evaluation have been
found to be property by Louisiana courts.23 These things include the
potential assets or rights of pension plans,24 retirement annuities,"
and profit sharing plans." Thus, unless they are prepared to retreat
from the expansive view of property expressed in Due, Louisiana
courts should classify professional goodwill as property.
One must be careful to distinguish professional goodwill as a
distinct asset of the professional practice from professional goodwill
as a factor contributing to the value of the professional practice. Courts
in jurisdictions which have found professional goodwill to be communi-
ty property have not specifically articulated this distinction. The
distinction is vital; if professional goodwill is considered as a distinct
property right, goodwill individually would be classified and, after
valuation, accounted for at dissolution of the marriage. Yet, if good-
will is envisioned as a factor contributing to the value of the prac-
tice, the spouse's interest in the practice as a whole would be classified,
valued, and accounted for at dissolution; the nonprofessional spouse's
compensation for the enhancement of the practice, if separate prop-
erty, would be limited to the right of reimbursement. Additionally,
it is conceptually clearer to disassociate professional goodwill from
the practice itself and to consider it as a separate patrimonial asset,
although professional goodwill's existence depends upon the continued
existence of the practice.
The following example illustrates the importance of the above
distinction. H, the sole surviving heir, inherits a professional practice
from his father during the existence of his marriage. Having recently
completed his medical internship, H decides to put his efforts into
his deceased father's practice. As an inheritance, the practice and its
22. See cases cited in notes 33-34, infra.
23. For a thorough discussion of things similar to professional goodwill which have
been found by Louisiana courts to be community property, see Comment, supra note
19, at 1117-18.
24. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 295 So. 2d 809 (1974).
25. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Messersmith v.
Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
26. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); Laffitte v. Laf-
fitte, 232 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
27. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2368.
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goodwill are Hs separate property,"0 but the professional goodwill
thereafter created will be community property.' Additionally, the earn-
ings and increased value of the practice as an entity will thereafter
be community property." Thus if the professional goodwill is treated
as a distinct patrimonial asset, it could be classified, depending upon
the circumstances, differently from the practice itself. Yet, if the good-
will is considered solely as a factor contributing to the value of the
practice, its classification would depend upon the practice's classifica-
tion. As the practice in this example is deemed to be I's separate
property, the professional goodwill would be also H's separate prop-
erty. In such a situation, the nonprofessional spouse's only compen-
sation would be the right of reimbursement for the enhancement of
the separate property of the professional spouse." However, reim-
bursement, which entitles the nonprofessional spouse to one-half of
the increased value attributed to the common labor, may not necessari-
ly represent the value of the professional goodwill. Hence, reimburse-
ment may not adequately compensate the nonprofessional spouse if
professional goodwill is characterized as a factor contributing to the
value of the practice, since the nonprofessional spouse only receives
monetary compensation for one-half the enhanced value and not a
separate property interest. Furthermore, reimbursement defies the
economic reality of the situation since professional goodwill is often
the most vital asset of the professional practice.
Development of Professional Goodwill as Community Property
Courts in four of the eight community property states have dealt
with the problem of whether professional goodwill is community
property.2 California's courts were the first to decide that professional
goodwill, if found to exist in a particular practice, was community
property.3 This approach was followed by Washington" and New
28. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341.
29. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
30. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338.
31. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2368. Reimbursement entitles the nonprofessional spouse
to one half of the increased value attributable to the uncompensated labor or industry
of the spouses.
32. The eight community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. The four states that have dealt with
professional goodwill as community property are California, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington.
33. See In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974);
In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); In re Marriage
of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App.
2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr.
735 (1969).
34. See In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979); In re
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Mexico. 5 In contrast, the Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize
professional goodwill as community property in the context of a sole
practitioner.' Yet, Texas appellate courts subsequently found that pro-
fessional goodwill in a professional corporation was community
property." Several noncommunity property states have treated pro-
fessional goodwill as a marital asset,38 although only one of these
jurisdictions has specifically held that professional goodwill is marital
property ."
California
Mueller v. Mueller" was the first case in California dealing with
professional goodwill as community property. In its decision, the court
of appeals concluded that professional goodwill was property of an
intangible nature. 1 The Mueller court then upheld the lower court's
finding of the existence of goodwill in the husband's dental laboratory
business 2 and the lower court's treatment of the goodwill as com-
munity property whose value had to be accounted for at dissolution.3
Yet, the court failed to articulate explicitly any reasoning for classi-
fying professional goodwill as community property.
In Brawman v. Brawman," the court noted that the husband's
law practice was community property and that it had substantial
Marriage of Kaplan, 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 (1979); In re Marriage of Freed-
man, 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 (1979); In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wash.
App. 560, 589 P.2d 1244 (1978); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558
P.2d 279 (1976).
35. See Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).
36. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
37. Trick v. Trick, 587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979); Geesbreght v.
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1978). Texas courts have treated
the sole practitioner differently from the professional corporation because the Texas
Supreme Court persists in handling the professional goodwill of the sole practitioner
as a part of the professional person, rather than a separate asset of the practice. Yet,
the Texas Supreme Court has expressly left unresolved the issue of whether the pro-
fessional goodwill of a corporation or partnership is community property. See text
at note 96, infra.
38. See In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979); In re
Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981); In re Marriage of Leon,
80 Ill. App. 3d 383, 399 N.E.2d 1006 (1980); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978); Grayer v. Grayer, 147
N.J. Super. 513, 371 A.2d 753 (1977); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557
P.2d 46 (1976).
39. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979).
40. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956).
41. 144 Cal. App. 2d at 251-52, 301 P.2d at 94-95.
42. 144 Cal. App. 2d at 251-52, 301 P.2d at 95.
43. 144 Cal. App. 2d at 252, 301 P.2d at 95-96.
44. 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962).
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value.'5 In its opinion, the court did not consider specifically the good-
will of the professional practice; yet, the court stated that because
a professional practice automatically goes to the spouse licensed to
practice it and continues after marital dissolution, the other spouse
should be compensated for his or her fair share as a "silent partner"
who withdraws." In Fritschi v. Teed, 7 the California appellate court,
in dictum, stated that "[o]n divorce and dissolution of the community
a professional practice perforce remains in the hands, of the spouse
licensed to practice it. Nevertheless, in terms of its existing economic
potential, it may have a substantial worth which must be taken into
account in evaluating the community estate for divorce purposes."' 8
Although the Brawman and Fritschi courts did not decide the
issue of professional goodwill as community property, they did
recognize the contribution made by the community to the future
earning potential of the professional spouse. The nonprofessional
spouse frees the professional spouse of other marital responsibilities
and enables the professional spouse to devote time and efforts to the
building of a successful professional practice.
Following these opinions, 9 a California appellate court, in Golden
v. Golden," classified professional goodwill as community property, thus
establishing a "rule" which has been followed consistently in later
cases. Golden involved an appeal by a husband, who was a sole medical
practitioner, from a lower court's division of community assets." In-
cluded in these assets was an allocation of $32,500 for the goodwill
of the husband's professional practice.0 The husband argued that there
45. 199 Cal. App. 2d at 882, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
46. 199 Cal. App. 2d at 882, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
47. 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1963).
48. 213 Cal. App. 2d at 726, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
49. In Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969), the appellate
court applied the rules of Brawman and Fritschi in upholding the trial court's valua-
tion of the husband's sole law practice. "While the right to practice law is a property
right which cannot be classed as community property, the value of the practice at
the time of dissolution of the community is community property." 272 Cal. App. 2d
at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
50. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969).
51. 270 Cal. App. 2d at 404, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
52. 270 Cal. App. 2d at 404, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737. This case reflects California's
approach to the "aggregate theory." Louisiana has never followed the "aggregate theory"
of partition; Louisiana instead has used the "item theory" of partition in kind or parti-
tion by licitation. New Civil Code article 2369.1, however, provides for the "aggregate
theory" of partition of the community property in Louisiana. See Note, Termination
of the Community, 42 LA. L. REV. 789, 811-12 (1982). See also notes 170-77, infra, and ac-
companying text.
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was no goodwill in his professional practice upon dissolution of the
marriage. The husband relied upon Lyon v. Lyon,53 which had held
that upon dissolution of a law partnership there could be no allowance
for goodwill, since the reputation of the firm depended upon the skill
of each member. The Golden court made a fundamental distinction
between the treatment of goodwill at partnership dissolution and the
consideration of professional goodwill at dissolution of the marital
community." The court stated that when a professional partnership
is being dissolved, a court cannot determine the amount of goodwill
attributable to each partner. But, in a marriage dissolution, the prac-
tice of the sole practitioner spouse will continue after dissolution of
the community with the same value it had during the existence of
the marriage. Under community property law principles, the nonprofes-
sional spouse makes the same contribution to the value of the profes-
sional business as he or she makes to the professional spouse's earn-
ings and other accumulations.5 By making this distinction, the court
recognized the economic reality of the situation when a professional
practice is involved'at the dissolution of the community: (1) the pro-
fessional business does continue, because it is that spouse's profes-
sion, and (2) the professional goodwill of the business had a substan-
tial and real value during the existence of the marriage.
California appellate courts did not again consider the issue of the
goodwill of a spouse's professional practice until In re Marriage of
Fortier,' in 1973. Although the issue in this case was the method
of valuation used by the lower court, the Fortier court stated that
"the goodwill of [the husband's] medical practice was, in fact, com-
munity property."57 This case indicates that the California appellate
courts have accepted the proposition that, if created during the mar-
riage, professional goodwill is community property.
53. 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966).
54. 270 Cal. App. 2d at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38. The court stated:
Where, as in Lyon the firm is being dissolved, it is understandable that a court
cannot determine what, if any, of the goodwill of the firm will go to either part-
ner. But, in a matrimonial matter, the practice of the sole practitioner husband
will continue, with the same intangible value it had during marriage. Under the
principles of community property law, the wife, by virtue of her position as wife,
made to that value the same contribution as does a wife to any of the husband's
earnings and accumulations during marriage. She is as much entitled to be
recompensed for that contribution as if it were represented by the increased value
of stock in a family business.
Id.
55. 270 Cal. App. 2d at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38.
56. 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973).
57. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
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Although all California cases prior to In re Marriage of Lopez"
had dealt with professional goodwill in the context of a sole practi-
tioner, the Lopez court experienced no difficulty in handling the pro-
fessional goodwill of a law partnership. The court stated that a trial
court should consider the issue of professional goodwill as community
property "whether related to that of a sole practitioner, a professional
partnership or a professional corporation." 9
The Lopez court analogized the value of the husband's interest
in the law partnership to the efforts, time, and skills of a spouse which,
in California, are community property."0 The court concluded that "if
'goodwill' in a professional practice as a going business is found to
exist as an asset at the time of a martial dissolution, such asset is
subject to the innumerable consequences"'" of community property law.
It further reasoned that, depending upon the particular circumstances
of the case, such professional goodwill could be "separate property,
community property, or varying degrees of both."'"
The Lopez court also indicated that courts should not ignore the
existence of professional goodwill merely because it is "elusive, intangi-
ble, difficult to evaluate and will ordinarily require special
disposition."63 Because the determination of the existence of goodwill
in a professional practice is a vital inquiry, the Lopez court estab-
lished several factors which may be used in determining the existence
or nonexistence of goodwill. 4 These factors include: (1) the practi-
tioner's age, health, and past demonstrated earning power; (2) his pro-
fesssional reputation in the community as to his judgment, skill, and
knowledge; (3) his comparative professional success; and (4) the nature
and duration of his business as a sole practitioner or as a member
of a partnership or professional corporation to which his professional
efforts have made a proprietary contribution.6' Additionally, the court
stated that the expectancy of future earnings should not be the basis
58. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974).
59. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68. The relevant California Code
provision which enumerates those things that make up community property is CAL.
CIV. CODE S 5110 (West Supp. 1979).
60. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 65. See Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal.
App. 2d 328, 332-33, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (1967).
61. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
62. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
63. Id.
64. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 109-10, 113 Cal, Rptr. at 68.
65. Id.
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for determining the value of professional goodwill, but rather, should
be a factor in determining the existence of such an asset."
Professional goodwill is community property in California if it is
found to have accrued to the professional spouse's practice during the
marriage. Professional goodwill as community property represents a
portion of the community's interest in the professional spouse's prac-
tice as a going concern. This portion has been referred to by the
California appellate court, in In re Marriage of Foster, as "community
goodwill." 7
Washington
The courts of the state of Washington first classified professional
goodwill as community property in In Re Marriage of Lukens." In
Lukens, the appellate court, which based its reasoning upon the Califor-
nia decisions discussed previously, 9 found that professional goodwill
was an asset of a professional practice that should be included in the
66. Id. In a subsequent case, In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117
Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974), the court significantly noted that goodwill may exist in a profes-
sional practice or in a business which is founded upon personal skill or reputation.
42 Cal. App. 3d at 582 n.2, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 52 n.2.
67. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 583-84, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 53. California courts accept the
fact that professional goodwill is community property; issues focus upon the existence
and valuation of the professional goodwill. See In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App.
3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1979), which involved a dispute as to the valuation of a
husband's interest in a medical partnership, which included the valuation of the part-
nership's goodwill. The appellate court reversed the trial court's valuation of the hus-
band's interest in the group medical practice. In re Marriage of Webb, 94 Cal. App.
3d 335, 156 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1979), involved a dispute about the value of the goodwill
of a husband's private investigation business. In finding that goodwill could exist in
a private investigation business, the court quoted Foster. "Goodwill may exist in a
professional practice or in a business which is founded upon personal skill or reputa-
tion." 94 Cal. App. 3d at 344, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 339, quoting 42 Cal. App. 3d at 582
n.2, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 52 n.2. In In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), the appellate court upheld the trial court's determination that
a husband had no goodwill interest of any value in a law firm, a professional corpora-
tion. In In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413, 149 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1978),
the major issue as to goodwill was the method and time of valuation of a husband's
medical practice (sole practitioner). In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577,
117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974), also involved the professional goodwill in a husband's medical
practice. See also In re Marriage of Denny, 115 Cal. App. 3d 543, 171 Cal. Rptr. 440
(1981); In re Marriage of Winn, 98 Cal. App. 3d 363, 159 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1979).
68. 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
69. 16 Wash. App. at 483-86, 558 P.2d at 280-82. The court cited Foster, Lopez,
Fortier, and Golden.
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property division. The husband in this case was an osteopathic physi-
cian who enjoyed a large clientele and a very successful practice. Dr.
Lukens had argued that as a sole practitioner, any goodwill associated
with his practice was personal and unmarketable, and, therefore,
valueless." The court, however, rejected this reasoning and recognized
that although the goodwill of Dr. Luken's practice was not readily
saleable, it did have a value.7 The court noted that "so long as he
maintains his osteopathic practice .. .he will continue to receive a
return on the goodwill associated with his name."72
In 1979, the issue of professional goodwill at marital dissolution
reached the Washington Supreme Court. In re Marriage of Fleege78
involved the queston of whether the goodwill of a husband's dental
practice was an asset subject to division as an item of community
property. The court in Fleege adopted the reasoning of the appellate
court in Lukens74 and noted that "the modern tendency is to
acknowledge the economic facts and take such [professional] goodwill
into account."75 The Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's decision not to include professional goodwill as an asset of com-
munity property and specifically found that professional goodwill ex-
isted in Dr. Fleege's practice." The court in Fleege held: "The value
of goodwill to the professional spouse, enabling him to continue to
enjoy the patronage engendered by that goodwill, constitutes a com-
munity asset and should be considered by the court in distributing
the community property." 7
Following the Fleege decision, two Washington appellate court deci-
sions, In re Marriage of Freedman" and In re Marriage of Kaplan,79
dealt with the professional goodwill of a husband's law practice. The
70. 16 Wash. App. at 483, 558 P.2d at 281.
71. 16 Wash. App. at 485, 558 P.2d at 281-82.
72. 16 Wash. App. at 486, 558 P.2d at 282.
73. 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979).
74. 91 Wash. 2d at 325-26, 588 P.2d at 1138.
75. 91 Wash. 2d at 329, 588 P.2d at 1139.
76. 91 Wash. 2d at 326-27, 588 P.2d at 1138.
A dentist who has practiced many years and established a good reputation can
expect his patients to return to him and to speak of him in a manner that enhances
that reputation and encourages others to seek his services. Also, he can expect
a large number, if not most of these patients to accept as their dentist a person
to whom he sells his practice. These prospects are a part of goodwill, and they
have a real pecuniary value.
Id.
77. 91 Wash. 2d at 330, 588 P.2d at 1140.
78. 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 (1979).
79. 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 (1979).
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court in Freedman said that the issue of whether professional good-
will could be community property was foreclosed by the Fleege
decision."s The Freedman court further stated that there was no dif-
ference between the professional practice of a dentist and that of an
attorney." The Kaplan court felt foreclosed by both Fleege and
Freedman.2
The courts in Freedman and Kaplan used imprecise language and
associated goodwill with the person of the professonal, rather than
with the practice itself. 3 The Fleege court, on the other hand, spoke
of the professional goodwill of the practice and the professional
spouse's interest therein and contribution thereto." The Fleege ap-
proach is clearer than the Freedman-Kaplan approach because speak-
ing of the goodwill of the professional person, rather than of the good-
will of the practice, is extremely close to evaluating the professional
spouse's future earning potential. 5 Louisiana courts should follow the
rationale of the Fleege court; they should view the community's in-
terest in professional goodwill as that portion of the goodwill at-
tributable to the professional spouse's interest in the practice. This
approach, which is also employed by California courts, should be con-
trolling whether the practice is a sole proprietorship, a professional
partnership, or a corporation.
New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Hurley v. Hurley," classified
professional goodwill as community property. The court distin-
guished the individual's right to practice a profession from the value of
the professional's practice as a business,87 and stated, "[o]nce [profes-
80. 23 Wash. App. at 29, 592 P.2d at 1125-26.
81. 23 Wash. App. at 29, 592 P.2d at 1126.
82. 23 Wash. App. at 504-05, 597 P.2d at 440. See also Suther v. Suther, 28 Wash.
App. 838, 627 P.2d 110 (1981), in which the court held that in valuing the husband's
interest in a mechanical contracting business, a close corporation, the goodwill of the
corporation must be included.
83. 23 Wash. App. at 28-29, 592 P.2d at 1125-26; 23 Wash. App. at 504-505, 597
P.2d at 440.
84. 91 Wash. 2d 327-30, 588 P.2d at 1138-40.
85. For a discussion of future earning potential as property, see Comment, A Prop-
erty Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV.
277, 281 (1981).
86. 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).
87. 615 P.2d at 259. The Hurley court noted that the right to practice a profes-
sion is a property right which cannot be classified as community property. See note
49, supra, where it is noted that the Todd court made a similar statement.
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sional goodwill's] existence and value are established, it should be in-
cluded in and divided along with other community property."88
Arizona
An Arizona appellate court, in Wisner v. Wisner," dealt with the
existence of goodwill in a husband's professional medical corporation.
The wife in Wisner had argued that a professional corporation could
possess goodwill. ° The Wisner court responded by stating, "We do
not reach this question, however, since in our opinion, the trial court
made no such finding [that a professional corporation cannot possess
goodwill]."'" The court chose to limit its decision to a reversal of the
trial court's finding that "there was no goodwill value to be attached
to this professional corporation."92 Although the Wisner court limited
its decision to the particular corporation at issue and refused to con-
sider the general question of the classification of professional good-
will as community property,93 the decision does ihdicate that Arizona
courts, when again presented with the issue of professional goodwill,
may follow the approach of the community property states discussed
above.
Texas
The Texas Supreme Court, in Nail v. Nail,9" refused to classify
the professional goodwill of a sole practitioner's medical practice as
community property. The Nail decision was based upon the court's
reasoning that "the accrued goodwill in the medical practice of Dr.
Nail .. .did not possess value or constitute an asset separate and
apart from his person, or from his individual ability to practice his
profession."95 Significantly, however, the court expressly left open the
issue as to the goodwill of a professional partnership or corporation."
88. 615 P.2d at 259. See Lucas v. Lucas, 95 N.M. 283, 621 P.2d 500 (1980), wherein
the Supreme Court of New Mexico distinguished Hurley and held that a husband's
contract not to compete was not community property when the stockholders received
adequate value for their interests in a corporation. Of course, the stock and the subse-
quent proceeds of. the stock sale were community property. 621 P.2d at 501-02.
89. 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981).
90. 129 Ariz. at 336, 631 P.2d at 118.
91. Id.
92. 129 Ariz. at 336-37, 631 P.2d at 118-19.
93. 129 Ariz. at 336, 631 P.2d at 118.
94. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
95. 486 S.W.2d at 764. The appellate court in Nail v. Nail, 477 S.W.2d 395, 398
(Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1972), treated the professional goodwill of a husband's
medical practice as community property. In so doing, the court adopted the approach
of Mueller.
96. 486 S.W.2d at 764.
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The question of the goodwill of a professional corporation was ad-
dressed by the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in Geesbreght v.
Geesbreght 7 The corporation in this case was Dr. Geesbreght's
emergency room service, which sold its services to local hospitals.
Recognizing that this was one of the questions left open by Nail, the
Geesbreght court held that the professional corporation did possess
goodwill separate from the doctor's person and that this goodwill was
an asset divisible upon divorce. 8 The court felt that the hospitals to
whom the corporation was providing its services would continue to
use the corporation's services even after Dr. Geesbreght's departure.
The El Paso Court of Civil Appeals, in Trick v. Trick," likewise
dealt with the goodwill of a professional corporation at marital dissolu-
tion. The Trick court followed the Geesbreght decision and affirmed
an award to Dr. Trick's wife which represented her interest in his
professional corporation's goodwill."°
Colorado
A court in one noncommunity property jurisdiction, Colorado, has
explicitly followed the rationale of the California and Washington deci-
sions. A Colorado appellate court, in In re Marriage of Nichols,''
reversed a trial court's refusal to consider goodwill as an intangible
asset of the husband's dental practice. After finding that goodwill did
exist in the husband's dental practice and that it had a substantial
value, the Nichols court held that "in a division of marital property,
the value of goodwill incident to [the] husband's practice which is an
asset acquired during his marriage, must be considered as marital
property."'0
97. 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1978).
98. 570 S.W.2d at 435-36.
99. 587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1979).
100. Id. at 773-74. The issue in Trick was whether or not the trial court had in-
cluded the value of the goodwill of the professional corporation in the valuation of
the stock. The appellate court found that the trial court had properly included the
value of the professional goodwill in the stock valuation and that the trial court had
attributed an appropriate value. Id. at 774.
101. 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979).
102. 43 Colo. App. at 385, 606 P.2d at 1316. The court noted:
A professional, like an entrepreneur who has established reputation for skill and
expertise, can expect his patrons to return to him, to speak well of him, and
upon selling his practice, can expect that many will accept the buyer and will
utilize his professional expertise. These expectations are a part of goodwill and
they have a pecuniary value.
Id.
The other noncommunity property states that have considered professional good-
will as an asset available for equitable distribution are New Jersey, Oregon, and II-
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The preceding analysis demonstrates that courts in community
property jurisdictions will likely classify professional goodwill as com-
munity property. This trend reflects an enlightened and modern view
of the nonprofessional spouse's predicament. At divorce, the profes-
sional spouse will retain his or her proportional interest in the pro-
fessional practice and its goodwill. During the marriage, the profes-
sional goodwill and the professional practice were enhanced because
of the time and energy the professional spouse was able to devote
to the practice. Yet, the contributions and sacrifices made by the non-
linois. In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Stern v. Stern, the question on ap-
peal was the valuation of the husband's law partnership interest. While reviewing
the trial court's evaluation, the Stern court noted that goodwill was one of the factors
which contributed to the value of the partnership. 66 N.J. 340, 344-47, 331 A.2d 257,
260-61 (1975). A New Jersey appellate court, in Grayer v. Grayer, reversed the trial
court's valuation of the husband's interest in his professional law partnership because
the trial court failed to include in its consideration a valuation of goodwill. 147 N.J.
Super. 513, 520-21, 371 A.2d 753, 758 (1977).
In Levy v. Levy, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, expressly dealt
with professional goodwill as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. The
Levy court approved the approach of treating professional goodwill as a marital asset,
but found that the husband's sole law practice had no goodwill to be included as an
asset in determining the practice's value. 164 N.J. Super. 542, 555, 397 A.2d 374, 381
(1978). These New Jersey cases indicate that, when presented with the proper case,
New Jersey courts may consider professional goodwill as a marital asset subject to
equitable distribution upon divorce.
In the Oregon case of In re Marriage of Goger, the appellate court said.that "the
goodwill of the professional corporation, is not only an asset .... but may, for a pro-
fessional corporation such as husband's, [a professional dental corporation] often be
the principal asset possessed by the corporation. As such, goodwill may be properly
considered when an interest in a corporation is among the marital assets to be divided."
27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46, 47 (1976).
Recently, an Illinois appellate court, in the case of In re Marriage of Leon, noted
that "the interest of a spouse in a law or medical partnership including the 'goodwill'
of such business has been held to be marital property" in other jurisdictions. The
court felt that the reasoning of these other jurisdictions was applicable to a husband's
insurance brokerage business since this business was similar to the sole practitioner
in a professional business. 80 Ill. App. 3d 383, 386, 399 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (1980). Another
recent Illinois appellate court decision, In re Marriage of White, held that a husband's
professional dental corporation can be marital property and that goodwill was a factor
to consider when valuing the professional dental corporation. The White court remanded
for a new trial and instructed the trial court to receive evidence of the value of the
dental corporation and to distribute the value. 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 382-84, 424 N.E.2d
421, 432-24 (1981).
See also Rostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1981); In re Marriage of Morris, 588
S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). In Rostel, the Supreme Court of Alaska analogized
the spouses' close corporation to a professional corporation since it was dependent
upon the husband's skills. The court held that goodwill must be included in the valua-
tion of the spouses' respective interests in their electrical supply corporation. 622 P.2d
at 430-31.
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professional spouse enabled the professional spouse to immerse himself
or herself in the professional practice. Since the whole theory of com-
munity property is that the nonprofessional spouse has contributed
equally to the practice by freeing the professional spouse of marital
responsibilities, professional goodwill created or enhanced under such
circumstances should be recognized as community property.
Professional Goodwill as Community Property in Louisiana
If Louisiana courts determine that professional goodwill is pro-
perty, they will have to classify it as community property or separate
property or both.0 3 The classification of professional goodwill, like the
103. The Louisiana Civil Code classifies all property involved at termination of a
marriage as separate property, community property, or degrees of both. LA. CIv. CODE
arts. 2338, 2339, 2341, 2343, 2343.1, & 2344. See notes 115-123, infra, and accompany-
ing text. For a through discussion of classification, see Note, Classification of Incor-
poreal Movables, 42 LA. L. REV. 744 (1982). The separate property of a spouse is his or
hers exclusively. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341. Separate property is composed of property
acquired by a spouse prior to the establishment of the community, property acquired
by a spouse with separate things or with separate and community things when the
value of the community things is inconsequential as compared to the value of the
separate things, and property acquired by a spouse by inheritance or donation to him
or her individually. Damages awarded to a spouse in an action for breach of contract
against the other spouse or for loss sustained as a result of fraud or bad faith in
the management of community property by the other spouse, and damages or other
indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection with the management of his or her separate
property are the separate property of a spouse. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341. Additionally,
things acquired by a spouse as a result of a voluntary partition of the community
during the existence of a community property regime are a spouse's separate proper-
ty. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336 & 2341. When a spouse donates his or her undivided interest
in a thing forming part of the community to the other spouse, that interest is
transformed into the separate property of the donee spouse. The donor spouse's in-
terest is likewise transformed into separate property, unless otherwise provided in
the act of donation. Also, all natural and civil fruits, minerals, and mineral lease revenues
produced from or attributable to the separate thing form part of the donee spouse's
separate property, unless otherwise provided in the act of donation. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2343. Damages for personal injuries sustained by a spouse during the existence of
the community are his or her separate property. Furthermore, the portion of damages
for loss of earnings that would have accrued after termination of the community prop-
erty regime, if the community is terminated in any manner other than by the death
of the injured spouse, is the spouse's separate property. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2344.
"[Elach spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community." LA.
CIv. CODE art. 2336. The community is comprised of property acquired during the ex-
istence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse, prop-
erty donated to the spouses jointly, and property acquired with community things
or with community and separate things when the community things are not inconse-
quential as compared to the separate things. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2338 & 2341. The
natural and civil fruits of community property are community property. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2338. Also, the natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse, minerals
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classificaton of all property at dissolution of a marriage, will involve
a determination of the manner and time of its acquisition.' The Loui-
siana Civil Code article by which professional goodwill would be
classified as community property is article 2338. In order to classify
professional goodwill as community property, its manner of acquisi-
tion must be through the efforts, skill, or industry of the professional
spouse and its time of acquisition must be during the existence of
the community property regime. With professional goodwill, the man-
ner of acquisition element is satisfied, for it is by virtue of the pro-
fessional spouse's working contributions to the practice that the pro-
fessional goodwill of the practice is either enhanced or harmed. The
working contributions of the professional spouse to the practice are
a direct result of his or her efforts, skill, and industry. The form of
the practice should not matter; in a sole proprietorship, partnership,
and corporation, the professional goodwill of the practice is involved
as a distinct asset.05 To recognize the community's interest in the
professional practice, Louisiana courts will have to determine the pro-
portion of professional goodwill attributable to the professional
spouse's efforts. In the majority of cases, this can be achieved by
delineating the professional spouse's proportionate interest in the pro-
fessional practice.
The second element of article 2338 is the time of acquisition. Loui-
siana courts have adopted three theories to determine the time of
produced from or attributable to a separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals, royalties
and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases on separate property are communi-
ty property, unless reserved as separate property in the manner provided by law.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339. The transfer by one spouse to the other of a thing forming part
of his or her separate property, with a stipulation that it shall become part of the
community, transforms that thing into community property. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343.1.
Additionally, that portion of the damages received for a personal injury sustained by
a spouse which can be attributed to the expenses incurred by the community or those
damages in compensation for the loss of community earnings are community property.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2344.
104. See Note, supra note 103, at 744.
105. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal Rptr. 58 (1974). In
Lopez the court stated:
The fact that "professional goodwill" may be elusive, intangible, difficult to evaluate
and will ordinarily require special disposition, is not reason to ignore its existence
in a proper case. . . . Whatever the result in a given case, we hold that where
the issue is raised in a marital dissolution action, the trial court must make a
specific finding as to the existence and value of the "goodwill" of a professional
business as a going concern whether related to that of a sole practitioner, a pro-
fessional partnership or a professional corporation.
38 Cal. App. 3d at 108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68.
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acquisition of property to be classified.06 These three theories are:
(1) inception of title, 7 (2) vesting,"8 and (3) pro rata.1' The inception
of title theory classifies property according to marital status at the
time of the initiation of the transaction granting the title."' The vesting
approach classifies property according to marital status at the time
the right to title vests, usually at the completion of the transaction."'
The pro rata theory classifies property as partially community and
partially separate; the relative portions depend upon the amount ac-
quired during the existence of the community property regime and
the amount acquired prior to the existence or after the termination
of the marriage. 2 Any one of these three approaches may be used
when dealing with the classification of property under article 2338."'
Because of the nature of professional goodwill, its time of acquisi-
tion will often be difficult to ascertain. Since professional goodwill
is acquired over an extended period of time, there is no definitive
time of acquisition. Goodwill is often acquired before, during, and after
the existence of the marriage. The inception of title approach and
the vesting approach cannot be used readily in determining the time
of acquisition of an asset acquired over time. No definite moment in
time exists from which the acquisition can be measured. Furthermore,
these approaches are unsuitable because professional goodwill involves
no title or transaction with which to establish the point of initiation
or completion. Thus, the pro rata theory is the theory most suitable
for determining time of acquisition of professional goodwill."4
106. Note, supra note 103, at 745.
107. The inception of title theory is concerned with the initiation of the transac-
tion involved. W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 4, at 220.
108. The vesting of title theory concentrates on the completion of the transaction.
W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 4, at 220-21.
109. The pro rata theory focuses upon "the overall percent of consideration paid
over time by the community and by a spouse separately," and it provides for "concur-
rent ownership by community and separate estates." W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra
note 4, at 221. See, e.g., T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 852-53
(La. 1976).
110. See Note, The Classification of Contingent Fee Contracts as Community or
Separate Property, 37 LA. L. REV. 1190, 1193-94 (1977).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Note, supra note 103, at 766.
114. Use of the pro rata theory, although not explicitly rejected, has been ques-
tioned recently by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56
(La. 1981). In Curtis, the court implied that pro rata classification is not recognized
in Louisiana. The issue in the case was whether a certain piece of immovable proper-
ty was the separate property of the wife or community property. Mrs. Curtis bought
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The following examples illustrate the utility and adaptability of
the pro rata theory for determination of the time of acquisition. W
the property during the existence of the marital community by means of a down pay-
ment of separate funds; later payments on the credit portion of the price were made
with rentals from the property. The act of sale declared that Mrs. Curtis bought the
property with her separate funds and that it was her separate property. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal prorated the property and found that the community's in-
terest was 52.5 percent and that Mrs. Curtis' separate interest was 47.5 percent. 388
So. 2d 816, 819 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980). The supreme court reversed, stating that
the court of appeal erred in holding that the property was partially community and
partially separate property. 403 So. 2d at 57. The court held that unlike other com-
munity property states which characterize property paid for in part with separate
and community funds as mixed, Louisiana law does not characterize property purchased
in such a manner as mixed; the court stated Louisiana law classifies property as either
community or separate. Id. at 57-58. The court then proceeded to classify the proper-
ty as the separate property of the wife under the inception of title theory. The court
indicated that the only right the community would have, if community funds were
used to pay the credit debt, was the right of reimbursement. Yet, the court found
that in the instant case the community did not have the right of reimbursement. Id.
at 60. Thus, the Curtis court rejected the application of the pro rata theory to the
classification of immovable property.
This implied rejection of the pro rata theory should be limited to immovable prop-
erty. Because of the factual circumstances, the classification of the immovable prop-
erty in Curtis as separate property by means of the inception of title theory was
justified. However, to view the Curtis case as a total rejection of the pro rata theory
in Louisiana would be improper. In many instances, the Civil Code does not address
which theory should be used for determining the time of acquisition for classification
purposes, as is evident by the broad language as to time used in both article 2338
and article 2341. Additionally, the legislature specifically provides for the use of the
pro rata method in article 2344, which relates to damages for personal injury to a
spouse. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2344. This article mandates that damages for the lost earn-
ings of an injured spouse be prorated between the community and his or her separate
estate. See Note, supra note 103, at 754. These articles indicate at least limited legislative
approval of the pro rata theory.
Also, the implication left by the court in Curtis is not consistent with the action
of the Louisiana Supreme Court over the last few years; on several occasions the court
has utilized the pro rata classification theory. See, e.g., Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161
(La. 1977); T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); West v. Ortego,
325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975). For example, in the classification of pension plans, which
are similar in many ways to professional goodwill (see notes 23-26, supra and accom-
panying text), the Louisiana Supreme Court used the pro rata theory and found that
the contributions to the plan made during the existence of the community entitled
the nonmember spouse to the "right to share pro rata in the proceeds ultimately payable
from the funds." T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 849-850 (La. 1976).
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has used the pro rata theory in the classifica-
tion of damages for personal injury to a spouse. West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La.
1975). Money damages were classified as either community or separate depending on
whether the losses were incurred before or after dissolution of the community. Id.
Finally, the pro rata approach was also used by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Due
v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977). In its classification of the rights under the husband's
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had a sole professional practice prior to her marriage which she con-
tinued during her marriage and after her divorce. The practice itself
is Ws separate property, and the professional goodwill acquired prior
to and after dissolution of the marriage is likewise W's separate
property."' Yet, the professional goodwill acquired through W's ef-
forts during the marriage is community property.1"' The value of the
professional goodwill attributable to these time periods must be pro-
rated between W's separate estate and the community. The deter-
mination of the value attributable to each period requires the use of
experts in the business, accounting, and economics fields.
If W joins a professional partnership prior to the existence of her
marriage, her interest in the practice itself and its professional good-
will acquired before the marriage are her separate property."7
However, her proportional interest in the professional goodwill aris-
ing after her marriage, represented by her proportional interest in
the partnership, is community property because it was acquired by
W's efforts during the existence of her marriage."8 The same analysis
applies to the situation where W buys into a professional corporation
prior to marriage and obtains a percentage of stock representing her
interest. In this case, the stock is W's separate property 9 and the
cash dividends are community property, unless W reserves them as
contingent fee contract, the court found that the value of contract interests based
upon the attorney's "services performed during the marriage" was community proper-
ty. Id. at 166. See Note, supra note 110, at 1199. Furthermore, the Due court indicated,
in dictum, that it would apply the pro rata approach to the partnership interest of
a spouse acquired partially prior to or after the existence of the community regime
and partially during the existence of the community by the efforts, skill, or industry
of the partner spouse. 242 So. 2d at 166.
The fact that the legislature did not provide for the use of any particular theory
in the classification of property, other than damages for personal injury, does not mean
that the legislature meant to foreclose the use of the pro rata approach in the classifica-
tion of other assets; rather, it indicates a desire on the part of the legislature to leave
the choice to the courts. Until the legislature indicates otherwise, Louisiana courts
should continue using the pro rata theory to avoid unjust dispositions, at least when
classifying incorporeal movables. See Note, supra note 103, at 760 & 765-68. See also,
Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977); T.
L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976); West v. Ortego, 325 So.
2d 242 (La. 1975).
115. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341. Property acquired by a spouse prior to the establish-
ment of the community property regime is his or her separate property.
116. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338. Property acquired during the existence of the legal
regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse is community property.
117. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341.
118. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338.
119. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341.
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separate.12 The professional goodwill of the corporation acquired dur-
ing the existence of marriage is community property.12 The result
is the same when W inherits the practice from a professional parent
and then marries or when W inherits the professional practice during
marriage and then commences professional work. In either case, the
practice and its prior goodwill are the separate property of W122 and
the professional goodwill acquired during the existence of W's mar-
riage by her efforts, skill, or industry is community property.123 These
examples demonstrate that by using the pro rata theory, Louisiana
courts will be able to deal adequately and fairly with the classifica-
tion of professional goodwill as community property.
Methods of Valuing Professional Goodwill
Upon dissolution of the community, Louisiana courts will have to
ascertain the present value of the "community" goodwill in order to
account for it at partition. Numerous methods of valuation of good-
will exist and are used in business transactions.
Book Value
The method least desirable for valuing professional goodwill is
the "book value" method. Book value represents the historical cost
of an asset less accumulated depreciation and amortization.12 '
Therefore, only purchased goodwill would have a book value. Good-
will which has been developed would not appear on the books under
generally accepted accounting principles.125 Book value rarely reflects
the price that goodwill would bring in the open market; it does not
reflect the excess earnings of the professional practice. The use of
the book value method assumes that the value of goodwill is shown
on the books, yet goodwill is often excluded as an asset on the books."
Normally, book value is substantially lower than the market value
of the professional goodwill.
120. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2339.
121. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
122. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341. Property acquired by a spouse by inheritance or dona-
tion to him or her individually is his or her separate property.
123. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338.
124. See Welch, Discovery and Valuation in a Divorce Division Involving a Closely-
Held Business or Professional Practice, 7 COMM. PROP. J. 103, 106 (1980).
125. "[Book value] is an arbitrary and conventional thing unrelated or in opposi-
tion to real value." Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1425, 1426 (1956).
126. See Note, Divorce-Division of Property-Professional Corporation May Have
Valuable Goodwill, Apart from Person of Individual Member, That Must Be Considered
in Property Settlement on Divorce, 11 ST. MARY'S L. J. 222, 230 (1979).
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Agreements
A method of valuation more acceptable than book value is the
use of agreements. These agreements often include partnership
agreements, stock purchase agreements, and buy-sell agreements. Such
agreements usually set forth a formula agreed upon by the members
of the practice which is to be used in the valuation of goodwill or
a member's proportional interest in the practice.'27 The formulas are
used to determine the value of a member's interest at death or retire-
ment, and they are used when one of the members chooses to
withdraw from the practice or another person wishes to enter the
practice.'28 Like book value, these agreements seldom reflect the
market value or present value of the professional goodwill. Additional-
ly, these agreements normally fail to account for the fact that at
dissolution of a marriage, the professional spouse will take with him
or her the goodwill he or she has acquired, since the professional
spouse usually continues in the same practice.
Despite the undesirability of this method, such agreements, when
existing, present a court with an easy way to value professional good-
will. This is reflected by the New Jersey case of Stern v. Stern.'29
The court in Stern used the value of the professional spouse's interest,
as set forth in the law partnership agreement, as the presumptive
value of the professional spouse's interest in the partnership.' The
formula set out in the agreement was established to determine a part-
ner's interest in the law partnership at death."' Additionally, the
California appellate court in In re Marriage of Lopez recognized this
method as a legitimate manner of determining the value of profes-
sional goodwill.'32 Thus, even though these agreements seldom reflect
127. See Norton, Professional Goodwill-Its Value in California Marital Dissolution
Cases, 3 COMM. PROP. J. 9, 13 (1976). See also In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738,
552 P.2d 1169, 131 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1976).
128. In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1979); Ken-
nedy & Thomas, Putting a Value on: Education and Professional Goodwill, 2 FAM. AD-
voc. 3, 4-5 (Summer 1979). In Slater, the court stated that the value of the contractual
right of withdrawal may provide a basis for determining the value of the community
interest in the professional goodwill, but the court did not foreclose a consideration
of other facts. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 246-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 689. See also Suther v.
Suther, 28 Wash. App. 838, 627 P.2d 110 (1981). In Suther, the Washington court of
appeals noted that a stock retirement agreement was a factor to be considered in
determining the value of a corporation's stock for marital dissolution purposes, but
that it was not alone determinative of the stock's value. 28 Wash. App. at 844-45,
627 P.2d at 113-14.
129. 66 N.J. 340, 345-46, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975).
130. 66 N.J. at 346, 331 A.2d at 261.
131. 66 N.J. at 346, 331 A.2d at 260.
132. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 69 (1974).
1982]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the present value of professional goodwill, they are useful tools for
a court. If no agreement exists, however, the courts must turn to
alternative methods of valuation.
Fair Market Value
The "fair market value" approach is the method of valuation
preferred by courts which have valued professional goodwill at dissolu-
tion of a marriage. Fair market value is the price agreed upon by
a willing buyer and a willing seller when both have knowledge of all
pertinent facts and circumstances and neither is compelled to act."'
As it relates to professional goodwill, fair market value is the price
at which the professional practice would sell if the market value of
all of the practice's tangible assets and other intangible assets was
excluded.'" Since professional goodwill is not sold in most dissolution
cases, the determination of its fair market value actually will be an
estimation. By use of expert testimony (that of an accountant or an
economist) and of testimony of members of the same profession, a
value which approximates the present price the professional goodwill
would bring on the open market can be ascertained. Additionally, the
price paid for the professional goodwill of comparable practices can
be used for establishing the fair market value of the professional good-
will at \issue.
The fair market value method is preferred by courts in dissolu-
tion cases because it does not take explicitly into consideration the
future earning capacity of the professional goodwill or the post-
dissolution efforts of the professional spouse. As expressed by the
Fortier court,
the value of the goodwill must exist at the time of the dissolu-
tion. That value is separate and apart from the expectation of
the spouse's future earnings .... [S]ince community goodwill may
be evaluated by no method that is dependent upon the post-marital
efforts of either spouse, then, as a consequence, the value of com-
munity goodwill is simply the market value at which the goodwill
could be sold upon dissolution of the marriage, taking into con-
sideration the expectancy of the continuity of the practice.' 5
133. See Ganier, Treatment of Goodwill: Allocating a Lump-Sum Purchase Price Among
Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. CORP. TAX'N 111, 119 (1980).
134. See G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
222 (1971); Comment, Community Property Interests in the Right of Publicity: Fame
and/or Fortune, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1118 (1978).
135. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 918. The "value must be established
without dependence upon the potential or continuing net income of the selling doc-
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Courts in later cases have acknowledged the philosophy of com-
munity property systems which dictates that post-marital efforts can-
not be considered in the valuation of community goodwill; yet, courts
have not accepted the fair market method as the exclusive method
available for valuation." The fair market value of an asset necessari-
ly reflects its potential for economic growth, because the price a will-
ing buyer will pay depends upon whether he or she feels that the
asset is capable of producing a return or profit in the future.'37 The
price paid, therefore, reflects the goodwill's "present dollar value of
the opportunity for expected business earnings."" Thus, determina-
tion of fair market value necessarily involves taking into account the
future earning potential of the professional goodwill; otherwise, the
goodwill would attract a deflated price or suffer a valuation of "zero."
However, the fair market value approach, while taking earning poten-
tial into consideration, does not set a dollar value on the future earn-
ing capacity except to the extent that it reflects the present value
of the professional goodwill.'39
The fair market value approach to valuation is advantageous, as
it often reflects the present value of the property as viewed by the
open market. Yet, there are several disadvantages to the use of this
method. One problem arises when the practice in question is a law
practice. It is unethical to sell the goodwill of a law practice. 4 ' Thus,
there is no readily available market from which the fair market value
tor." 34 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 918. The court in Fortier specifically
determined the value of professional goodwill by the use of a price which had been
agreed upon by Dr. Cafarelli when he entered Dr. Fortier's practice. 34 Cal. App.
3d at 387, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 917 (1973). Dr. Cafarelli agreed to forego a certain percen-
tage of income from the practice for a two year period. The court found that the
value of goodwill was equal to the amount waived by Dr. Cafarelli. The court viewed
this price, agreed upon at the formation of the partnership, as an arms-length transac-
tion establishing the market price of the medical practice's goodwill. 34 Cal. App. 3d
at 387, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 917. See In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117
Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979).
See also In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 16 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1979).
136. See In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 583-84, 117 Cal. Rptr. at
53; In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68; Hurley v.
Hurley, 615 P.2d at 259.
137. See Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution,
7 Sw. U.L. REV. 186, 200 (1975).
138. Ganier, supra note 133, at 131.
139. See Norton, supra note 127, at 14. See also Udinsky, An Economist's View of
Professional Goodwill in a Community Property Setting, 5 COMM. PROP. J. 91, 95 (1978).
140. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1980). See Geffen v. Moss,
53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 225-27, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687, 692-94 (1976). See also Stern v. Stern,
66 N.J. at 346-47, 331 A.2d at 261; Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 1243 (1977).
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of the goodwill of a law practice can be determined. This problem
may plague many other professional practices, because many profes-
sions, due to their degree of specialization, have relatively small
markets, if any, available. In these situations, the determination of
fair market value is more of a guess than a reflection of the profes-
sional goodwill's true value. Furthermore, where there is no actual
market, such that no potential buyer can be found, theoretically, there
is no goodwill at all, for its market value would be "zero. '' 1
Another problem occurs when the market is unstable. In a
depressed market, the market value of the professional goodwill will
be deflated. Conversely, if the market is temporarily inflated, the price
designated will be increased superficially.
A final problem arises in dissolution cases because normally the
professional practice is not sold to a third party. Because the profes-
sional practice continues as it did before dissolution and the profes-
sional spouse is generally more capable of serving the needs of his
or her clientele than anyone else, the determined market value will
probably be higher than it would be if actually sold to a third person."
The market value actually will be the value of the goodwill to the
professional spouse, rather than the value of the goodwill to third
persons buying the practice. "3
Excess Earnings
Economists view professional goodwill as a professional practice's
excess earnings.'" The goodwill of the professional practice "con-
stitute[s] a unique resource which that [practice] possesses and others
do not." ' Every professional practice is not equally desired by the
general public; rather, each practice possesses individual characteristics
which cause its clientele to choose it over other similar practices.146
The continued patronage of a practice's clientele creates that prac-
tice's excess earnings or professional goodwill.
The method for determining the value of professional goodwill based
upon past excess earnings is generally referred to as the capitaliza-
141. Miller, Valuing the Goodwill of a Professional Practice, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 107,
110 (1975). See also In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
142. See Udinsky, supra note 139, at 94.
143. See 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Forensic Economics S 64, at 383-84 (1978).
144. See Kennedy & Thomas, supra note 128, at 5; Udinsky, supra note 139, at
94; 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Forensic Economics S 13, at 285-87 (1978).
145. 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Forensic Economics S 13, at 288 (1978).
146. See Udinsky, supra note 139, at 93.
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tion of excess earnings."7 One such valuation method, commonly known
as the "formula" method, views goodwill as the amount of earnings
in excess of a fair return on net tangible assets and other invested
capital." 8 This value is determined by a three-step process. First, the
average net earnings for a representative period preceding the valua-
tion date is determined. This period is seldom less than a five year
period. The valuation date in dissolution cases is the date of dissolu-
tion. Next, an amount representing a fair return on the average tangi-
ble assets for the same period must be deducted from the average
net earnings. This amount is usually from 8 to 10 percent, depending
upon the degree of risk involved in the practice. The greater the risk,
the higher the return percentage used. The remainder, if any exists
after deduction of the return on tangible assets from net earnings,
is the average annual earnings of the intangible assets of the business.
Goodwill is the major intangible asset of most businesses; in some
cases, goodwill is a business's only intangible asset. The third step
involves capitalization of the intangible asset earnings (the excess earn-
ings) on the basis of an appropriate percentage, usually 15 to 20 per-
cent. Higher percentages are used for higher risk practices, and lower
rates are used for lower risk practices." 9 "The [eight] percent rate
of return and the [fifteen] percent rate of capitalization are applied
to tangibles and intangibles, respectively, of [practices] 'With a small
risk factor and stable and regular earnings; the [ten] percent rate of
return and [twenty] percent rate of capitalization are applied to [prac-
tices] in which the hazards of business are relatively high."" The pro-
cedure described is the basic formula method; however, individual
cases may call for special adjustments, such as the elimination of earn-
ings for atypical years."'
Another method of capitalization of excess earnings, better suited
to the case of a sole practitioner, computes excess earnings by com-
paring the average income of the independent professional to the
average income of a salaried professional of equivalent stature. An
amount for a fair return on the professional's invested capital is then
deducted from the difference in these two incomes. The resulting dif-
ference represents the excess earnings, or the income derived from
147. Id.
148. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. See 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Forensic
Economics S 13, at 286 (1978).
149. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. See 34 AM. JUR. 2d Valuation of Property S
8976, at 898-99 (1981).
150. G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, supra note 134, at 469.
151. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. See 34 AM. JUR. 2D Valuation of Property S
8977, at 899 (1981).
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the professional goodwill. These excess earnings are then capitalized
at an appropriate rate, usually 10 to 20 percent, depending on the
risk factor of the practice, to determine the present value of the pro-
fessional goodwill of the professional spouse's practice.'52
These capitalization of excess earnings methods are viable alter-
natives for determining the present (actual) value of professional good-
will based on the past experience of the practice and its expectations
of success in the future, as represented by the percentages of
capitalization.15' These methods are preferred by the nonprofessional
spouse, because they generally yield higher valuations than the market
value approach, even when a relatively low percentage rate is used."
The capitalization of excess earnings approach was recognized as
a legitimate method for valuing professional goodwill in the New Mex-
ico case of Hurley v. Hurley."' In Hurley, the New Mexico Supreme
Court acknowledged the Fortier limitation that the valuation of pro-
fessional goodwill should not be dependent on a professional spouse's
potential earning capacity. Yet, the court stated that "the value of
community goodwill is not necessarily the amount of money that a
willing buyer would pay for such goodwill .... We feel that [capitaliza-
tion of excess earnings] is a legitimate, although not an exclusive,
method of evaluation of community good will which should have been
considered by the trial court.9'
Multiples of Income
An alternative accounting method of calculating the value of pro-
fessional goodwill is to use a multiple of gross or net income. This
method assumes that goodwill is directly reflected by the gross or
net income of the practice. 7 The gross or net income of the practice
over specified periods of time (either monthly or yearly) is multiplied
by specified factors to determine the value of the professional good-
will."5 8 The factors vary depending upon the field of practice.5 9
152. See 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Forensic Economics SS 57-63, at 375-82 (1978).
See also Kennedy & Thomas, supra note 128, at 5.
153. See Comment, supra note 137, at 204.
154. See Adams, supra note 2, at 71; Walzer, Marital Dissolution: Valuation of Good
Will in Business and Professional Practices, 27 S. CAL. TAX INST. 377, 384-85 (1975).
155. 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).
156. 615 P.2d at 259, citing In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109
Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973).
157. See Norton, supra note 127, at 12-13.
158. Id. See Bergman, The Valuation of Goodwill, 53 L.A.B.J. 87, 93 (1977) (now
entitled L.A. LAW.).
159. Bergman, supra note 158, at 93-94.
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This method, as well as the capitalization of excess earnings method,
was used in a 1956 California case, Mueller v. Mueller,"' in determin-
ing the value of professional goodwill for dissolution purposes. The
weakness of the multiples of income method is that it fails to sub-
tract, from the calculation of the value of goodwill, the fair market
value of the tangible assets and the fair market value of the initial
capital investments of the professional. Thus, the valuation determined
by this method may be higher than the actual value of the profes-
sional goodwill. This method has not been accepted by the courts as
readily as the fair market value or capitalization of excess earnings
methods,'' yet it has not been entirely foreclosed as an alternative.
The preceding discussion shows that the methods available to
Louisiana courts for the valuation of professional goodwill are varied
and limitless.'62 As expressed by the Hurley court, "[tihere appears
to be no definitive rule for the determination of the value of good
will."" Despite the restrictive language of Fortier, valuation methods
which take the expectancy of economic potential into consideration
can still be used as long as their calculations do not include a monetary
value for future earnings or post-dissolution efforts of the professional
spouse. The determination of the present value of any asset necessarily
includes a consideration of its potential for economic growth.'6
Partition of Professional Goodwill Between the Spouses
Professional goodwill, after it has been recognized as property,
classified as community property, and valued according to its present
value, must be accounted for between the spouses at dissolution of
the community. In Louisiana, the method of dividing community prop-
erty at dissolution of the community is by partition.' The two
160. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 252, 301 P.2d 90, 95 (1956).
161. See text at notes 133-156, supra.
162. A recent edition of the Family Advocate contains a checklist of documents
to be used in valuing business and professional interests. Koritzinsky, Documents Needed
for Valuation of Business and Professional Interests, 4 FAM. ADVOC. 17 (Spring, 1982).
For a brief discussion of the business ramifications arising from the valuation of a
business' assets at divorce, see Jacobs, Divorce Opens aFamilyFirm toScrutiny, Division
of Assets, Wall St. J., March 8, 1982, at 25, col. 1.
163. 615 P.2d at 259, citing In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117
Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974).
164. See text at notes 137-139, supra.
165. For more extensive discussions of partition at termination of the community,
see Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the
1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 137-41 (1979); Comment, Judicial
Dissolution of the Marital Community in Louisiana, 49 .TUL. L. REV. 167 (1974); Note,
supra note 52, at 811-16.
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categories of partition provided for in the Civil Code are voluntary
partition and judicial partition."' If the spouses are in agreement, they
can effectuate a voluntary partition of the community property 7 and
can stipulate this agreement in court."8 When the spouses cannot agree
to a voluntary partition, either spouse has the right to file for a judicial
partition.'69 Regardless of the category of partition chosen, it will be
difficult for Louisiana courts to partition professional goodwill because
of its incorporeal nature and its physical indivisibility from the
practice.
In 1981, the Louisiana legislature adopted Civil Code article 2369.1.
This article deals specifically with partition at dissolution of the
community' and supplements the Civil Code articles dealing with
partition. 7' Article 2369.1 introduces the "aggregate theory" of parti-
tion in kind to Louisiana in order to ensure just partitions between
spouses. Prior to the adoption of article 2369.1, Louisiana had followed
the "item theory" of partition in kind; however, all other community
property states had followed some form of the "aggregate theory."'72
166. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1294; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4601.
167. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1322.
168. See Comment, supra note 19, at 1107.
169. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1323; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4602.
170. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.1 provides:
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of the community, either
spouse may obtain a judgment decreeing a partition of the community in kind
by allocation of assets and liabilities of equal net value to each spouse. If the
community or any part thereof cannot be conveniently divided, the court shall
order partition by licitation.
171. The two traditional methods of judicial partition are partition in kind and
partition by licitation. Judicial partition is regulated by the rules appearing in the
chapter of the Civil Code on the partition of successions and by the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure relative to partition. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1289-1414; LA.
CODE Civ. P. arts. 4601-4608. Partition in kind is the physical division of property in ac-
cordance with the percentage of ownership of each co-owner. Partition by licitation
is the sale of property in its entirety at a public auction and delivery of one half
of the proceeds to each spouse. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1339. Partition in kind is the pre-
ferred method of judicial partition, but when the property is by its nature indivisible
in kind or when the property cannot be conveniently divided, the court must order
partition by licitation. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4606; LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1339-1340. See,
e.g., Babineaux v. Babineaux, 237 La. 806, 112 So. 2d 620 (1959); Ballard v. Ballard,
367 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). Property cannot be divided conveniently when
diminution of the property's value or a loss or inconvenience to one of its owners
results from the property's division. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1340.
172. W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 4, at 444-45. Two states, California and
New Mexico, provide for an equal value aggregate theory. Other community property
states provide for a just or equitable distribution aggregate theory. Id. at 464-65. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 25-318A (Supp. 1978); CAL. Civ. CODE S 4800 (West 1979); IDAHO
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Both theories are methods of partition in kind, for both involve the
manner of physical distribution of assets or property. Under the "item
theory," each item of community property that is susceptible of divi-
sion in kind is divided equally between the spouses. Those items that
are not susceptible of division in kind are partitioned by licitation.
The "aggregate theory" involves the allocation of certain assets to
one spouse and the allocation of the remaining assets to the other
spouse, even though individual items are not divisible in kind.' Loui-
siana's "aggregate theory" further requires that the net value of the
aggregate of assets assigned to each spouse be equal. The "equitable"
or "just" distribution method, followed by a majority of the communi-
ty property states,"' does not require a net equality in the allocation
of assets; rather, it requires only that the assignment of certain assets
to one or the other spouse be fair or equitable. Article 2369.1, by
stipulating that the net values must be equal, rejects the notion of
equitable distribution in Louisiana.
Adoption of the "aggregate theory" demonstrates the Louisiana
legislature's willingness to provide a flexible partition mechanism for
the spouses.'75 Article 2369.1 provides for "a partition of the community
CODE ANN. S 32-712 (Supp. 1980); NEv. REV. STAT. 125, 150 (1979); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
S 3.63 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 26.09.080 (Supp. 1976). See also Sands v.
Sands, 48 N.M. 458, 152 P.2d 399 (1944).
173. See Note, supra note 52, at 811-12.
174. See note 172, supra, and accompanying text.
175. The "item theory," traditionally followed by Louisiana, failed to provide flexi-
ble alternatives, particularly to spouses who had assets of substantial value which
were insusceptible of partition in kind and which one or the other spouse did not
really wish to sell. In such a situation, the spouses were usually left with the un-
satisfactory alternative of judicial sale. For example, the "item theory" partition of
the controlling stock of a closely held corporation would result in a loss of control
of the company by the interested spouse. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334 (repealed by 1979
La. Acts, No. 709, S 1). Under the present law the stock would be classified as com-
munity property because of article 2338.
Yet, under the old law, partition by licitation would result perhaps in total loss
of the stock or in receipt of less than its actual value. See Note, supra note 52, at
812-13. See also, Comment, supra note 165, at 185-86. In Ballard v. Ballard, 367 So.
2d 1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), the partition of the stock of Ballard's, Inc., a closely
held corporation owned by the community and managed by the husband, was at issue.
The trial court ordered that the stock, although susceptible of partition in kind, be
partitioned by licitation because if it was divided fifty-fifty the total value of the two
parcels of stock would be less than the present value of all or 100% of the stock.
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's method of
partitioning the stock and found that the stock of this closely held corporation should
be partitioned in kind because of the circumstances of the spouses. The court believed
the detriment that might be suffered by the unequal bidding power of the wife in
a partition by licitation required a partition in kind. The wife would have been at
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in kind by allocation of assets and liabilities of equal net value to each
spouse."'16 As applied to professional goodwill, this article can offer
substantial assistance to the courts in partitioning community prop-
erty between the spouses at dissolution of the marriage. The article
allows the value of professional goodwill to be considered in a parti-
tion. Under the law prior to the adoption of 2369.1, professional good-
will, assuming there was no voluntary partition, was not susceptible
of "item theory" partition in kind, for professional goodwill is an asset
indivisible by nature.177 Professional goodwill cannot be partitioned
by licitation individually because the professional goodwill of a prac-
tice cannot be sold separately from the practice itself. The court would
have to order the sale of the professional practice with its profes-
sional goodwill in order to sell the professional goodwill. It is unlike-
ly that a court will order the sale of a professional practice, even
when the practice is community property. Furthermore, in many in-
stances, a practice will be the separate property of the professional
spouse. Thus, a court should not be able to force the sale of a prac-
tice with the professional goodwill. 7 '
a serious disadvantage if there had been a partition by licitation because she could
not have afforded to bid for the stock at public auction. The court noted that because
there was no real market for the stock of a close corporation, it was reasonable to
assume that only the parties or their representatives would bid at a public auction.
Thus, in this case, the husband was most likely to have been the sole bidder at the
public sale and the wife's interest in the close corporation probably would not have
been protected adequately. Because of these fears, the court decided that a partition
in kind, although it would leave the parties in substantially the same situation as prior
to the partition, would assure each spouse's receipt of his or her share of the reasonable
market value of the corporate stock. 367 So. 2d at 1226.
In most cases under the old law, the interested spouse could retain the controlling
stock of a closely held corporation only by reaching a voluntary agreement or by pur-
chasing all of the stock at a judicial sale. The first alternative could force the interested
spouse to accept terms that he or she felt were unacceptable in order to avoid loss
of the controlling interest or total loss of the stock through judicial sale. The second
alternative, buying all of the stock at judicial sale, involved a substantial investment
of cash as well as the risk of being overbid, which again would result in total loss
of the stock. Thus, this kind of situation often left the spouses in a dilemma unresolved
by the Civil Code. Today, this dilemma can be alleviated in most instances by the
application of article 2369.1. In the situation described above, a court can allocate the
stock to the spouse interested in keeping it and give the other spouse other assets
of equal net value, assuming sufficient assets are available to be so allocated. LA. CiV.
CODE art. 2369.1.
176. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2369.1 (emphasis added).
177. See, e.g., Succession of Jurisich, 224 La. 325, 333, 69 So. 2d 361, 363 (1953);
Vonderbank v. Schmidt, 44 La. Ann. 264, 271, 10 So. 616, 619 (1892).
178. In Deliberto v. Deliberto, the First Circuit Court of Appeal, in dictum, indicated
that under the new matrimonial regimes law and the new property articles, the fami-
ly home and the land upon which it is built would be classified differently. The court
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The old scheme failed to provide the nonprofessional spouse with
any acknowledgment of his or her interest in the professional good-
will except by the possible right of reimbursement.179 Reimbursement
was the only remedy available to the nonprofessional spouse when
the practice was the separate property of the other spouse; this situa-
tion still holds true today because Louisiana courts have not yet
classified professional goodwill as community property. The nonprofes-
sional spouse, under both the old"s and the new law,'81 is entitled at
suggested that it would classify the real estate as the separate property of the hus-
band, while it would classify the family home on this separate property as community
property. However, the Deliberto case was decided under the old community property
regime, since the community involved had existed under the old regime. The husband
and wife had built a home during the existence of the marriage upon the husband's
separate property. The court held that, upon dissolution, the wife was entitled only
to the right of reimbursement, that is, one-half of the value of the enhancement of
the husband's separate property due to improvements by community funds. In a foot-
note, the court indicated that under the theory of real subrogation expressed in new
Civil Code article 491, the home would be community property because it was built
with community funds. The land upon which the house sat would remain the husband's
separate property. Thus, rather than just providing the community with the right
of reimbursement, the court would classify each piece of property separately, even
though they were physically attached.
Furthermore, the court suggested that it would require partition by licitation of
the house and the land to satisfy the community property interests of the wife in
the home. This suggestion resulted from the fact that partition by licitation was the
only alternative to "item theory" partition in kind at the time of the Deliberto opinion,
and the house was not capable of being partitioned in kind.
The different classifications of the house and the land raise the same partition prob-
lems encountered when the professional practice is separate property and the pro-
fessional goodwill is community property. The house is attached to the land just as
the goodwill is attached to the practice. The sale of the home requires the sale of
the husband's separate property just as the sale of the community goodwill requires
the sale of the professional spouse's separate practice. Although the conclusion of the
court indicates that it would require a sale of the husband's separate property to realize
a sale of the community home, it seems unlikely that a court will require a person
to sell his or her separate professional practice to effecuate a partition of the good-
will. These problems should not plague the Louisiana courts today because article 2369.1
provides a potential solution. Under article 2369.1, the home and the goodwill can be
given to the spouse who owns the land and the practice and equivalent assets or a
promissory note can be given to the other spouse, thereby giving each equal net values.
Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096, 1099 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
179. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709) & LA. CIv. CODE art.
2368. Under article 2408, a spouse was entitled to reimbursement when the separate
property of the other spouse was increased or improved during the marriage by the
common labor of either spouse. If the increase was due to the ordinary course of things,
the spouse was not entitled to reimbursement. The reimbursement amount was one-
half the value of the increase. See, e.g., Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 793, 797 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1982).
180. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2408 (repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709).
181. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2368.
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least to reimbursement for one-half of the value of the enhancement
of the separate practice if he or she can prove that this increase is
due to the common labor or industry of either spouse.' But, if this
increase is due to economic changes, the nonprofessional does not
receive any reimbursement."s This remedy may be inadequate because
reimbursement of one-half of the enhancement to the separate prac-
tice may not reflect the nonprofessional's property interest in the pres-
ent value of the professional goodwill. Furthermore, reimbursement
does not give the nonprofessional spouse a distinct property interest.'M
Presently, if the practice is community property, no right of reim-
bursement is due the nonprofessional spouse; the sole recognition given
professional goodwill is as a factor contributing to the value of the
practice. The nonprofessional spouse is denied a distinct property in-
terest in what is perhaps the most valuable asset of the professional
practice.
Article 2369.1 provides an avenue for adequate recognition of the
nonprofessional spouse's property interest in professional goodwill. The
courts now can award the goodwill to the professional spouse and
allocate property or assets of equal net value to the nonprofessional
spouse. This system provides an alternative that allows the spouses
to escape the inadequacy of the "item theory" of partition in kind.18'
The language of article 2369.1 suggests that partition by licita-
tion should be a last resort.'6 Initially, the article provides that there
should be a partition in kind by allocation of assets if it is at all possi-
ble. The article then provides that only when the community or any
part of it cannot be conveniently divided is there to be a partition
by licitation.8 7 Thus, the order in which the legislature placed the
182. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2408 (repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709); LA. CiV. CODE art.
2368. See Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d at 797.
183. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2408 (repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709). Article 2368 does
not state specifically, as did article 2408, that if the increase is due to the natural
flow of commerce, no reimbursement is due. However, article 2368 does provide that
reimbursement is due only for that labor which is uncompensated. Thus, the article
implicitly indicates that only those increases due to the labor of the spouses shall
be compensated by reimbursement. No reimbursement is due if the increase is caused
by market changes or the compensated labor of the spouses.
184. See text at notes 30-32, supra.
185. "Item theory" partition in kind caused probable diminution in value of the
community asset or loss or inconvenience to one of the spouses. The only alternative,
partition by licitation, resulted in total loss of the property or the receipt of less than
the actual value of the asset.
186. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2369.1.
187. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2369.1
[Vol. 43
COMMENTS
alternatives seems to establish "aggregate theory" partition in kind
as a priority. The test of convenience under article 2369.1 should be
the same test that existed under the prior law of partition at dissolu-
tion; when dividing property would diminish its value or create a loss
or inconvenience to one of the spouses, partition by licitation should
be required. However, the likelihood that partition by licitation will
be used is greatly reduced by the adoption of the flexible "aggregate
theory" of partition in kind.
Despite its attractiveness, new Civil Code article 2369.1 has
numerous deficiencies. The article does not provide specific guidance
in allocating assets; rather, it merely provides for the ultimate stan-
dard of equal net value. The article is result oriented and does not
provide means for achieving the desired goal of net equality. Other
deficiencies of article 2369.1 become apparent when professional good-
will is involved as the item of community property in dispute. A
serious problem arises when the community does not own a sufficient
amount of other valuable and substantial property which the court
can allocate to the nonprofessional spouse to establish equal net value
In many cases, the value of the professional goodwill will be so high
that the spouses often will not have other community assets of equal
net value, thus preventing the "aggregate theory" partition. Nor is
partition by licitation a viable alternative since professional goodwill
cannot be sold separately from the practice,188 and it seems unlikely
that a court will order a spouse to sell his or her professional prac-
tice, his or her means of livelihood. Therefore, the legislation offers
no specific alternative by which the nonprofessional spouse can realize
his or her one-half ownership interest in the goodwill of the profes-
sional practice.
A liberal reading of article 2369.1 would solve this problem by
allowingthe court to order-the professional spouse to execute a prom-
issory note payable to the nonprofessional spouse for one-half of the
value of the goodwil. 189 This note would represent the value owed
to the nonprofessional spouse for one-half of the present value of pro-
fessional goodwill at dissolution of the marriage. By giving a promis-
sory note, the professional spouse actually purchases the other
188. See note 177, supra, and accompanying text.
189. See In re Marriage of Winn, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
In Winn, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's valuation of $15,000 for the
husband's business, and its order that the husband purchase the wife's one-half in-
terest by executing a promissory note for $7,500. See also Comment, Identifying, Valu-
ing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community Property at Dissolution of the
Marital Community, 56 TuL. L. REV. 313, 329-30 (1981).
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spouse's interest in the goodwill; this has much the same effect as
giving up other items of community property of equal net value. There
should be no objection to the use of a promissory note to represent
the value owed by the professional spouse to the nonprofessional
spouse. A note is a thing of value, like cash or a check, and it can
be easily sold and negotiated. Generally, the financial needs of both
spouses would be best served if the note were paid in installments
rather than on demand. Additionally, there is no reason why the note
should not be interest-bearing. 9 ' Interest will compensate the non-
professional spouse for the loss of the use of the money or other assets
he or she may have been allocated if the spouses had had other
substantial assets at the time of dissolution, and interest will insure
that the note's value over time will be equivalent to the present value
of the professional goodwill. The court should order that the note be
secured to further insure that the nonprofessional spouse will even-
tually receive the value of his or her interest in the goodwill. 9'
190. See In re Marriage of Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 931, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161,
163 (1976). The interest on the note should be sufficient to insure that the note will
be worth its stated face value in the market, since the stated face value represents
the amount necessary to equalize the division. If the interest is not sufficient, the
note may be substantially discounted if negotiated, and the spouse receiving the note
will not receive equal value as required by article 2369.1. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Hermann, 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 366, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553 (1978). Also, if the in-
terest is not a sufficient rate, it will not compensate the spouse for the effects of
inflation or the loss caused by the inability to use the asset or assets he or she would
have received. At the minimum, the interest rate should be the legal interest rate,
presently twelve (12) percent, unless the court finds that the circumstances of the
spouses warrant a lower rate. Whether a higher rate, such as that being presently
charged in the market, is necessary should depend upon the circumstances, needs,
and abilities of the spouses. The court should at all times keep in mind that the goal
is an equal division of the assets and should tailor the interest rate to achieve this
equality. Furthermore, the interest rate may depend upon the term of the note. A
short term note would require a lesser rate of interest than a long term note because
of the effects of inflation and the fact that the spouse awarded the note in lieu of
his or her interest in the asset must wait a longer period of time to realize his or
her interest.
191. The note awarded should be secured in a manner that will reasonably insure
receipt of the value of the nonprofessional spouse's interest in the professional good-
will. The security, like the interest rate, should be tailored to the circumstances, needs,
and abilities of the spouses. The professional spouse, for example, could pledge his
or her interest in the practice to secure the note. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3133-3175
(specifically arts. 3153 & 3155). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d
241, 248, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (1979) (involved the pledge of a husband's one-half
partnership interest in a professional medical partnership to secure a note the hus-
band was ordered to execute in favor of the wife in order to equalize the community
property division). The court could require the professional spouse to mortgage any
immovable property he or she may own. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3278-3310. Additional-
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The use of a promissory note is further supported by the fact
that article 2369.1 closely resembles California Civil Code section 4800.
Section 4800 provides for the equal division of community property.192
In interpreting this section, California courts have allowed a spouse
to equalize the division of assets at dissolution by execution of a prom-
issory note.193 This use of a promissory note allows the professional
spouse to compensate the nonprofessional spouse for his or her owner-
ship interest in the goodwill in a manner advantageous to the economic
interests of both spouses. The professional spouse is not forced to
suffer a substantial loss at one time.
An additional weakness is article 2369.1's failure to establish a
time for the determination of the value of the community's assets and
liabilities. In Louisiana, the time of valuation of community property
for purposes of a judicial partition is when the notary effectuates the
partition."' The value of each asset is established by the notary with
the assistance of appraisers 9. or by the stipulation of the parties. 9 '
Since the spouses are co-owners in indivision of the community prop-
erty until it is partitioned, the valuation of the asset as close to the
homologation of the partition as possible will accord each spouse the
present value of his or her interest in the community property.197 When
the asset is one that is acquired over time, such as professional good-
ly, the court could require the professional spouse to give the nonprofessional spouse
a chattel mortgage on any equipment or machinery he or she may own. See LA. R.S.
9:5351-5356 (Supp. 1981). See also LA. R.S. 9:5357-5372 (Supp. 1981), relating to the mort-
gage of all corporeal movables used in any commercial, business, or industrial activity
by mortgage of the immovable on which they are located. These three forms of securi-
ty are merely illustrative; other forms of security may be determined by the court
or suggested by the parties.
192. CAL. CIV. CODE S 4800 (West Supp. 1979).
193. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 248-49, 160 Cal. Rptr.
686, 690-91 (1979).
194. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1325 & 1326; LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3131-3137 & 4604. See
Ballard v. Ballard, 367 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
195. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3132.
196. 367 So. 2d at 1224.
197. Thus, when an appellate court reviews the method of partition chosen by the
trial court, the court uses the present value of the disputed assets. See National American
Bank of New Orleans v. Cleveland, 273 So. 2d 848, 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). When
the partition is a voluntary partition, the value of the community assets is designated
by the spouses. If the voluntary partition is later attacked by one of the spouses as
lesionary, the court, in order to ascertain if there has been lesion, uses the fair market
value of the community assets at the time of the partition agreement. LA. CIv. CODE
arts. 1398 & 1870-71. See Pitre v. Pitre, 162 So. 2d 430, 431 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964),
affd, 247 La. 594, 172 So. 2d 693 (1965). See also Bedwell v. Bedwell, 399 So. 2d 685,
686 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Watkins v. Watkins, 376 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979); Beatty v. Vining, 147 So. 2d 37, 45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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will, time of valuation difficulties occur. The value of professional good-
will acquired during the existence of the community should be the
value of the goodwill from the date of marriage until the date of
dissolution of the marriage. This time frame for valuation was allud-
ed to in Hamilton v. Hamilton'90 by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeal when it determined for partition purposes the wife's in-
terest in the husband's retirement plan and thrift plan benefits which
were acquired before, during, and after the marriage.'99 The Hamilton
court awarded the wife a one-half interest in the amount of benefits
credited to the husband during their marriage. ° and indicated that
the wife's interest could be appraised at a certain monetary value.' °
Additionally, in Laffitte v. Laffitte, °2 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peal awarded the wife a one-half interest in the portion of her hus-
band's employee profit sharing plan which was credited to him dur-
ing their marriage.2 3 Therefore, by analogy to the treatment of benefit
plans, the courts in partition cases should value professional goodwill
by using the present value of the value it had from the beginning of
the marriage until the dissolution of the marriage. Since article 2369.1
does not provide a definitive time for valuation of community assets
and liabilities," a specific time for valuation should be designated in
an amendment to article 2369.1 in order to avoid the difficulties
presented by assets, such as goodwill, which are acquired over time.0 '
198. 258 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
199. Id. at 662-63.
200. Id. at 663.
201. Id. The court remanded the case for a valuation of the wife's interest.
202. 232 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
203. Id. at 95-96. The total amount credited to the husband during this period was
$7,905.51. The court held the husband accountable to the wife for one-half of this amount.
Id. at 96.
204. The California Civil Code specifically provides that for purposes of making
an equal division of property, "the court shall value the assets and liabilities as near
as practicable to the time of trial." CAL. CIV. CODE S 4800 (West Supp. 1979). However,
if a party, upon 30 days notice to the other party, moves for a different date, the
court for good cause shown, may value the assets and liabilities at a date after the
separation of the spouses and prior to the trial.
205. A bill was introduced in the 1982 legislative session to repeal article 2369.1
and reenact it with substantial additions as section 2801 of Title 9 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes. La. S.B. 261, 45th Reg. Sess. (1982). The substantial changes provid-
ed for by this legislation are detailed procedures and rules to be followed by the spouses
and the courts in effectuating a partition of the community. The purpose of the legisla-
tion is "to give the court authority to do what the spouses usually do in an amicable,
negotiated property settlement."
This bill protects spouses' community property interests and guides Louisiana's courts
in partitioning the community. The legislation retains the "aggregate theory" of parti-
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tion in kind and the requirement of equal net value in allocation of the assets and
liabilities of the community.
The bill provides that either spouse, upon termination of the community, may in-
stitute a proceeding for partition of the community property or for settlement of the
claims arising from the matrimonial regime. In the proceeding, each party files a detailed
descriptive list of all community assets and liabilities, including the fair market value
and location of each asset. An inventory is not required, because it was seen as a
useless and expensive requirement in a community property partition. Additionally,
each party must either traverse or concur in the inclusion or exclusion of each asset
or liability and the valuations contained in the descriptive list. The court is permitted
to appoint experts to assist in the settlement and partition of the community.
The legislation provides for specific instances when the court can appoint experts
to assist it. Experts may be appointed for the classification of assets as community
or separate, the appraisal of community assets, the settlement of the claims of the
parties, and the allocation of assets and liabilities to the spouses.
'Finally, the court partitions the community according to the five following rules:
(1) The court must value the assets as of the time of the trial on the merits. This
remedies the time of valuation problem posed by article 2369.1 and professional good-
will. Until the trial on the merits, the spouses are co-owners in indivision of the com-
munity property; thus, the choice of this time adequately assures that each spouse
receives the present value of his or her ownership interest in each community asset.
(2) After valuation, the court is required to divide community assets and liabilities
in a fashion which ensures that each spouse receives property of equal net value.
(3) The court must allocate all assets and liabilities of the community. Yet, the court
has discretion in allocating each particular asset or liability to allocate it equally or
unequally between the spouses or to allocate it entirely to one of the spouses. In exer-
cising its discretion, the court must consider the nature and the source of the asset
or liability and the economic condition of each spouse. The court also may consider
any other circumstances that it considers relevant. Significantly, the legislation pro-
vides that, as between the spouses, the allocation of a liability to a spouse obligates
that spouse to extinguish the liability, but it in no way affects the rights of creditors.
See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357. This article provides for the rights of creditors vis-A-vis the
community and the spouses. These rights remain intact and are not affected by the
provisions of the legislation. If the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an
unequal net distribution, the court must order the payment of an equalizing sum of
money. The equalizing sum of money can be in cash or in deferred payments, and
it can be secured or unsecured. Additionally, the sum shall be upon the terms and
conditions decided by the court. The court may order the execution of notes, mort-
gages, or other documents it deems necessary, or the court may impose a mortgage
or lien on the movable and immovable property of either the community property
or the separate property of a spouse, depending upon the circumstances. La. S.B. 261,
45th Reg. Sess. (1982). (See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1366, which provides for a money adjust-
ment to compensate an heir for a lot which is unequal in value, in instances where
the heirs choose to draw lots). (4) When the court finds that the partial or total alloca-
tion of an asset would be inequitable to a spouse, it can order the spouses to draw
lots for the asset or it can order the private sale of the asset according to terms
and conditions it may set. Possible terms and conditions include the minimum price,
the terms of sale, the execution of realtor listing agreements, and the period of time
during which the asset shall be offered for private sale. La. S.B. 261, 45th Reg. Sess.
(1982). (5) If none of the above alternatives are feasible, the court shall order a parti-
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Conclusion
A community property system's goal is to treat spouses equally
as to certain property acquired during the existence of their marriage.
Community property systems recognize the efforts of a nonworking
spouse whose daily contributions to the marriage are considered legally
as vital as those of a working spouse. Louisiana, as a community prop-
erty state, should follow the lead of her sister states: Louisiana courts
should classify professional goodwill as community property. Such a
classification gives a nonprofessional spouse an equal interest in what
may be the most valuable asset possessed by spouses. With the use
of experts in the accounting and economics fields, Louisiana courts
can arrive at an accurate value of the professional goodwill and thus
eliminate perhaps the most difficult barrier to its recognition. Final-
ly, Louisiana courts now have available the mechanism of article 2369.1
to effectuate a partition of professional goodwill.
Eve Barrie Masinter
tion by licitation. The public sale shall be subject to terms and conditions established
by the court in its discretion and may include a minimum bid requirement. If there
is a partition by licitation, the court must expressly state the reasons why the asset
could not be allocated, assigned by drawing lots, or sold at private sale. La. S.B. 261,
45th Reg. Sess. (1982). Since partition by licitation is to be a last resort, the express
reasons for the judicial sale are necessary so that an appellate court can determine
from the record whether or not a public sale was justified.
This proposal represents a carefully designed scheme to alleviate the present inade-
quacies of the Louisiana Civil Code articles dealing with partition at dissolution. The
Louisiana legislature should adopt a scheme of partition similar to this proposal so
that Louisiana courts can afford each spouse the full and present value of all their
community property interests. Such a flexible system will assure practical and just
partitions between the spouses.
(Editor's note: Senate Bill 261 was enacted in 1982 La. Acts, No. 439, amending LA.
R.S. 9:2801.
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